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Abstract.
Complex resource allocation systems provide the fundamental support for the
normal functioning and well being of the modern society. Computationally and
mathematically, such systems can be modeled as minority games. A ubiquitous
dynamical phenomenon is the spontaneous emergence of herding, where a vast majority
of the users concentrate on a small number of resources. From an operational point
of view, herding is of grave concern as the few overused resources can be depleted
quickly, directing users to the next few resources and causing them to fail, and so on,
and eventually leading to a catastrophic collapse of the whole system in short time.
To devise strategies to prevent herding from occurring is thus of interest. Previous
works focused on control strategies that rely on external interventions, such as pinning
control where a fraction of users are forced to choose a certain action. Is it possible
to eliminate herding without any external control? The main point of this paper
is to provide an affirmative answer through exploiting artificial intelligence (AI). In
particular, we demonstrate that, when agents are empowered with reinforced learning
(e.g., the popular Q-learning in AI) in that they get familiar with the unknown game
environment gradually and attempt to deliver the optimal actions to maximize the
payoff, herding can effectively be eliminated. Furthermore, computations reveal the
striking phenomenon that, regardless of the initial state, the system evolves persistently
and relentlessly toward the optimal state in which all resources are used efficiently.
However, the evolution process is not without interruptions: there are large fluctuations
that occur but only intermittently in time. The statistical distribution of the time
between two successive fluctuating events is found to depend on the parity of the
evolution, i.e., whether the number of time steps in between is odd or even. We
develop a physical analysis and derive mean-field equations to gain an understanding
of these phenomena. As minority game dynamics and the phenomenon of herding
are common in social, economic, and political systems, and since AI is becoming
increasingly widespread, we expect our AI empowered minority game system to have
broad applications.
Keywords: Self-Organized Processes, Resource Allocation, Artificial Intelligence,
Minority Game, Reinforcement Learning
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1. Introduction
The tremendous development of information technology has made it possible for
artificial intelligence (AI) to penetrate into every aspect of the human society. One
of the fundamental traits of AI is decision making - individuals, organizations, and
governmental agencies tend to rely more and more on AI to make all kinds of decisions
based on vast available information in an ever increasingly complex environment. At the
present, whether a strong reliance on AI is beneficial or destructive to the mankind is an
issue of active debate that attracts a great deal of attention from all the professions. In
the vast field of AI related research, a fundamental issue is how AI affects or harnesses
the behaviors of complex dynamical systems. In this paper, we address this issue by
focusing on complex resource allocation systems that incorporate AI in decision making
at the individual agent level, and demonstrate that AI can be quite advantageous for
complex systems to reach their optimal states.
Resource allocation systems are ubiquitous and provide fundamental support for
the modern economy and society, which are typically complex systems consisting of a
large number of interacting elements. Examples include ecosystems of different sizes,
various transportation systems (e.g., the Internet, urban traffic systems, rail and flight
networks), public service providers (e.g., marts, hospitals, and schools), as well as social
and economic organizations (e.g., banks and financial markets). In a resource allocation
system, a large number of components/agents compete for limited public resources in
order to maximize payoff. The interactions among the agents can lead to extremely
complex dynamical behaviors with negative impacts on the whole system, among which
irrational herding is of great concern as it can cause certain resources to be overcrowded
but leave others unused and has the potential to lead to a catastrophic collapse of the
whole system in relatively short time. A general paradigm to investigate the collective
dynamics of resource allocation systems is complex adaptive systems theory [1–3]. At
the microscopic level, multi-agent models such as the minority game model [4] and
interaction models based upon the traditional game theory [5–7] have been proposed to
account for the interactions among the individual agents.
Minority game is a paradigmatic model for resource allocation in population, which
was introduced in 1997 [4] for quantitatively studying the classic El Farol bar-attendance
problem first conceived by Arthur in 1994 [8]. In the past two decades, minority game
and its variants were extensively studied [9–35], where a central goal was to uncover the
dynamical mechanisms responsible for the emergence of various collective behaviors. In
the original minority game model, an individual’s scheme for state updating (or decision
making) is essentially a trial-and-error learning process based on the global historical
winning information [4]. In other models, learning mechanisms based local information
from neighbors were proposed [11, 12, 16, 17, 25, 28, 31–35]. The issue of controlling
and optimizing complex resource allocation systems was also investigated [32], e.g.,
utilizing pinning control to harness the herding behavior, where it was demonstrated
that a small number of control points in the network can suppress or even eliminate
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herding. A theoretical framework for analyzing and predicting the efficiency of pinning
control was developed [32], revealing that the connecting topology among the agents
can play a significant role in the control outcome. Typically, control requires external
interventions. A question is whether herding can be suppressed or even eliminated
without any external control.
In this paper, we address the question of how AI can be exploited to harness
undesired dynamical behaviors to greatly benefit the operation of the underlying
complex system. More generally, we aim to study how AI affects the collective
dynamics in complex systems. For this purpose, we introduce a minority game model
incorporating AI at the individual agent level, where the agents participating in the
game are “intelligent” in the sense that they are capable of reinforced learning [36],
a powerful learning algorithm in AI. Empowered with reinforced learning, an agent
is capable of executing an efficient learning path toward a pre-defined goal through a
trial-and-error process in an unfamiliar game environment. Our model is constructed
based on the interplay of a learning agent and the environment in terms of the states,
actions, rewards, and decision making. In reinforced learning, the concepts of value
and value functions are key to intelligent exploration, and there have been a number
of reinforced learning algorithms, such as dynamic programming [36, 37], Monte Carlo
method [36, 37], temporal differences [36, 38], Q-Learning [36, 39, 40], Sarsa [36], and
Dyna [36], etc. To be illustrative, we focus on Q-learning, which was demonstrated
previously to perform well for a small number of individuals in their interaction with an
unknown environment [41, 41–44]. However, here we consider minority game systems
with a large number of “intelligent” players, where Q-learning is adopted for state
updating in a stochastic dynamical environment. The question is whether the multi-
agent AI minority game system can self-organize itself to generate optimal collective
behaviors. Our main result is an affirmative answer to this question. Particularly, we
find that the population of AI-empowered agents can approach the optimal state of
resource utilization through self-organization regardless of the initial state, effectively
eliminating herding. However, the process of evolution toward the optimal state is
typically disturbed by intermittent, large fluctuations (oscillations) that can be regarded
as failure events. There can be two distinct types of statistical distributions of the
“laminar” time intervals in which no failure occurs, depending on their parity, i.e.,
whether the number of time steps between two consecutive failures is odd or even. We
develop a physical analysis and use the mean-field approximation to understand these
phenomena. Our results indicate that Q-learning is generally powerful in optimally
allocating resources to agents in a complex interacting environment.
2. Model
Our minority game model with agents empowered by Q-learning can be described, as
follows. The system has N agents competing for two resources denoted by r = +1 and
−1, and each agent chooses one resource during each round of the game. The resources
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have a finite capacity Cr, i.e., the maximum number of agents that each resource can
accommodate. For simplicity, we set Cr = N/2. Let A(t) denote the number of agents
selecting the resource r = +1 at time step t. For A(t) ≤ Cr, agents choosing the
resource +1 belong to the minority group, and win the game in this round. Conversely,
for A(t) > Cr, the resource +1 is overcrowded, so the corresponding agents fail in this
round.
The Q-learning adaptation mechanism [40] is incorporated into the model by
assuming that the states of the agents are parameterized through Q functions that
characterize the relative utility of a particular action. The Q functions are updated
during the course of the agents’ interaction with the environment. Actions that lead
to a higher reward are reinforced. To be concrete, in our model, agents are assumed
to have four available actions, and we let Q(s, a) be the Q value of the corresponding
action at time t, where s and a denote the current state of agent and the action that
the agent may take, respectively. A Q function can then be expressed in the following
form:
Q =
[
Q(+1,+1) Q(+1,−1)
Q(−1,+1) Q(−1,−1)
]
.
For an agent in state s, after selecting a given action a, the corresponding Q value is
updated according to the following rule:
Qt(s, a) = Qt−1(s, a) + α[R + γQmaxt−1 (s
′, a′)−Qt−1(s, a)], (1)
where α ∈ (0, 1] is the learning rate and R is the reward from the corresponding action.
The parameter γ ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor that determines the importance of
future reward. Agents with γ = 0 are “short sighted” in that they consider only the
current reward, while those with larger values of γ care about reward in the long run.
The quantity Qmaxt−1 (s
′, a′) is the maximum element in the row of the s′ state, which
is the outcome of the action a based on s. Equation (1) indicates that the matrix Q
contains information about the accumulative experience from history, where the reward
R (for action a from state s) and the expected best value Qmaxt−1 (s
′, a′) based on s′ both
contribute to the updated value Qt(s, a) with the weight α, and the previous value
Qt−1(s, a) is also accumulated into Qt(s, a) with the weight 1− α.
While agents select the action mostly through reinforced learning, certain
randomness can be expected in decision making. We thus assume that a random action
occurs with a small probability , and agents select the action with a large value of
Q(s, a) with probability 1− . For a given setting of parameters α and γ, the Q-learning
algorithm is carried out, as follows. Firstly, we initialize the matrix Q to zero to mimic
the situation where the agents are unaware of the game environment, and initialize the
state s of each agent randomly to +1 or −1. Next, for each round of the game, each
agent chooses an action a with a larger value of Qt(s, a) in the row of its current state s
with probability 1− , or chooses an action a randomly with probability . The Q(s, a)
value of the selected action is then updated according to Eq. (1). The action that leads
to the state s′ identical to the current winning (minority) state has R = 1, and the
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action leading to the failed (majority) state has R = 0. Finally, we take the selected
action a to update the state from s to s′.
Distinct from the standard supervised learning [45], agents adopting reinforced
learning aim to understand the environment and maximize their rewards gradually
through a trial-and-error process. The coupling or interaction among the agents is
established through competing for limited resources. Our AI based minority game model
also differs from the previously studied game systems [32] in that our model takes into
account agents’ complicated memory and decision making process. For our system, a
key question is whether the resulting collective behaviors from reinforced learning may
lead to high efficiency or optimal resource allocation in the sense that the number of
agents that a resource accommodates is close to its capacity.
3. Self-organization and competition
In the traditional minority game, the dynamical rules stipulate that competition and
learning among agents can lead to the detrimental herding behavior, to which game
systems composed of less diversified agents are particularly susceptible [32–35]. In
our AI minority game system of agents empowered with reinforced learning, herding
is dramatically suppressed. To give a concrete example, we set the parameters for Q
learning as: learning rate α = 0.9, discount factor γ = 0.9, and exploration rate  = 0.02.
Figure 1(a) shows the temporal evolution of the number A(t) of agents choosing resource
+1. The main features of the time series are the continuous oscillations of A(t) about the
capacity Cr of resources, convergence of the oscillation amplitude, and bursts ofA(t) that
occur intermittently. As the oscillations converge to the optimal state, the two resources
r = +1 and r = −1 play as the minority resource alternatively. The remarkable feature
is that the agent population tends to self-organize into a non-equilibrium state with
certain temporal pattern in order to reach the highly efficient, optimal state, but the
process is interrupted by large bursts (failures or fluctuations).
3.1. Convergence of oscillations
Emergence of two types of agents. From numerical simulations of the AI minority
game system, we find that, as the system self-organizes itself into patterns of regular
oscillations, agents with two types of behaviors emerge. The first type is those agents
who are “self-satisfied” in the sense that they remain in either the s = +1 state or the
s = −1 state. Those agents win and lose the game alternatively as the system develops
regular oscillations. The population sizes of the self-satisfied agents are denoted as
n(+1,+1) and n(−1,−1), respectively. The second type of agents are the “speculative”
agents, or speculators, who switch state at each time step between s = +1 and s = −1.
These agents always win the game when the system exhibits regular oscillations. We
denote the population sizes of the speculative agents as n(+,−) and n(−,+), which
correspond to the two possibilities of switching: from s = +1 to s = −1 and vice versa,
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Figure 1. Typical temporal evolutionary behavior of the proposed AI
minority game system with reinforced learning empowered agents. (a)
Time series of the attendance A(t) of resource +1. Interactions among the agents
make the system self-organize into a special temporal pattern with two main features:
the convergence of regular oscillations towards the optimal value Cr = N/2, and
intermittent bursts of failures in utilizing resources. (b) A schematic sketch of the state
transitions of agents during the dynamical process. There are self-satisfied agents in a
fixed state and speculative agents that continuously switch state between +1 and −1.
(c) Time series of Q(s, a) as the numerical solutions of Eqs. (2-4). The parameters are:
learning rate α = 0.9, discount factor γ = 0.9, exploration rate  = 0.02, and system
size N = 5001.
respectively.
Figure 1(b) shows the state transition paths induced by the self-satisfied agents and
the speculative agents. The oscillations of A(t) associated with the convergent process
can be attributed to the state transition of the speculative agents between the states +1
and −1. This agrees with the intuition that, e.g., the investing behavior of speculators
in a financial market is always associated with high risks and large oscillations. Due
to the decrease in the population of the speculative agents, the oscillation amplitude in
any time interval between two successive failure events tends to decay with time.
Stable state of Q table. The oscillations of A(t) mean that r = +1 and −1 act as the
minority resource alternatively. For the self-satisfied agents, according to the Q-learning
algorithm, the update of the element Q(s+, a+) can be expressed as,{
Qt+1(s+, a+) = Qt(s+, a+) + α[R + γQt(s+, a+)−Qt(s+, a+)]
Qt+2(s+, a+) = Qt+1(s+, a+) + α[γQt+1(s+, a+)−Qt+1(s+, a+)] , (2)
where Qmaxt (s
′, a′) = Qt(s+, a+) due to the inequality Q(s+, a+) > Q(s+, a−). The
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update of the element Q(s−, a−) is described by{
Qt+1(s−, a−) = Qt(s−, a−) + α[R + γQt(s−, a−)−Qt(s−, a−)]
Qt+2(s−, a−) = Qt+1(s−, a−) + α[γQt+1(s−, a−)−Qt+1(s−, a−)] , (3)
where Qmaxt (s
′, a′) = Qt(s−, a−) as a result of the inequality Q(s−, a−) > Q(s−, a+).
For the speculative agents, the updating equations of elements Q(s+, a−) and
Q(s−, a+) are {
Qt+1(s+, a−) = Qt(s+, a−) + α[R + γQt(s−, a+)−Qt(s+, a−)]
Qt+2(s−, a+) = Qt+1(s−, a+) + α[R + γQt+1(s+, a−)−Qt+1(s−, a+)], (4)
where Qmaxt (s
′, a′) = Qt(s−, a+) or Qt(s+, a−), due to the inequalities Q(s+, a+) <
Q(s+, a−), and Q(s−, a−) < Q(s−, a+).
Figure 1(c) shows numerically obtained time series of the elements of the matrix
Q from Eqs. (2-4). For the self-satisfied agents, the values of Q(s+, a+) and Q(s−, a−)
increase initially, followed by an oscillating solution between the two values Q∗1 and Q
∗
2,
where
Q∗1 =
[1 + α(γ − 1)]αR
1− [1 + α(γ − 1)]2
and Q∗2 =
αR
1− [1 + α(γ − 1)]2
are obtained from Eqs. (2) and (3). For the speculative agents, both Q(s+, a−) and
Q(s−, a+) reach a single stable solution Q∗3 = R/(1 − γ), which can be obtained by
solving Eq. (4). The three relevant values have the relationship Q∗1 < Q
∗
2 < Q
∗
3.
The emergence of the two types of agents can be understood from the following
heuristic analysis. In the dynamical process, a speculative agent emerges when the
element associated with an agent satisfies the inequalities Q(s+, a−) > Q(s+, a+) and
Q(s−, a+) > Q(s−, a−) simultaneously. Initially, the agents attend both resources +1
and −1, with one group winning but the other losing. Only the group that always wins
the game can reinforce themselves through further increment inQ(s+, a−) andQ(s−, a+).
The stable group of speculative agents leads to regular oscillations of A(t), because they
switch states together between +1 and −1. An agent becomes self-satisfied when it
is in the +1 state and the inequality Q(s+, a+) > Q(s+, a−) holds, or in the −1 state
and Q(s−, a−) > Q(s−, a+) holds. The self-satisfied state can be strengthened following
the evolution governed by Eqs. (2) and (3), with Q(s+, a+) or Q(s−, a−) reaching the
oscillating state between Q∗1 and Q
∗
2, as shown in Fig. 1(c). We see that the condition
for an agent to become speculative is more strict than to be self-satisfied. Moreover, a
speculative agent has certain probability to become self-satisfied, as determined by the
value of the exploration rate . As a result, the population of the speculative agents
tends to shrink, leading to a decrease in the oscillation amplitude |n(+,−) − n(−,+)|
and convergence of A(t) closer to the optimal state N/2.
For the special case of  = 0 [the gray regions in Figs. 2(a) and 2(b)], agents take
action entirely based on historical experience Q. In this case, the numbers of the self-
satisfied and speculative agents become constant, and A(t) no longer converges to that
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Figure 2. Convergence of regular oscillations and bursts of failure. (a,b)
Convergence of the regular oscillation pattern depends on the exploration behavior
of the agents as characterized by the rate . For  = 0 (gray region), the oscillation
amplitude does not converge. (c,d) Detailed processes for the bursts of failure. If the
regular oscillations do not cross the line Cr = N/2 but behave either as (c) A(t) > Cr
and A(t + 1) > Cr or as (d) A(t) < Cr and A(t + 1) < Cr, the regular oscillations
stop and a systematic failure burst emerges. The blue line specifies A(t) = Cr. The
parameters are the same as in Fig. 1.
associated with the optimal state. It is thus apparent that exploration plays a crucial
role in the convergence of the system dynamics toward the state in which the resources
are optimally utilized.
3.2. Intermittent failures in the AI minority game system
The intermittent bursts of failure events in the whole system take place during the
convergent process to the optimal state. An understanding of the mechanism of the
failures can provide insights into the articulation of strategies to make the system more
robust and resilient.
The criterion to determine if an agent selecting +1 wins the minority game is
A(t) < Cr = N/2. If the event A(t) < Cr [or A(t) > Cr] occurs twice in row, the
oscillation pattern will be broken. Since the agents are empowered with reinforced
learning, two consecutive winnings of either resource −1 or resource +1 represent an
unexpected event, and this would lead to cumulative errors in the Q table, triggering
a burst of error in decision making and, consequently, leading to failures in utilizing
the resources. To see this in a more concrete way, we note that a self-satisfied agent
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wins and fails alternatively following a regular oscillation pattern. If the agent fails
twice in row, its confidence in preserving the current state is reduced. As a result,
the event Q(s+, a+) < Q(s+, a−) or Q(s−, a−) < Q(s−, a+) would occur with a high
probability, leading to a decrease in the populations n(+,+) and n(−,−) of the self-
satisfied agents. The populations of the speculative agents, n(+,−) and n(−,+), are
increased accordingly. These events collectively generate a bursting disturbance to the
regular oscillation pattern of A(t), terminating the system’s convergence toward the
optimal state, as shown in Figs. 2(a) and 2(b).
In general, the stability of the regular oscillations depends on two factors: the
equilibrium position determined by the self-satisfied agents, and the random fluctuations
introduced by agents’ exploration behavior. For the first factor, the equilibrium position
is given by A0 = n(+,+) + [n(−,+) − n(+,−)]/2, which deviates from Cr due to
the asymmetric distribution of the self-satisfied agents in the two distinct resources.
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show two examples with the equilibrium position A0 larger
or smaller than Cr (the blue solid line), respectively. We see that the converging
process is terminated when either the upper or the lower envelope reaches Cr, i.e.,
when two consecutive steps of A(t) stay on the same side of Cr in replacement of an
oscillation about Cr. In the thermodynamic limit, for an infinitely large system with self-
satisfied agents symmetrically distributed between +1 and −1 (so that the equilibrium
position A0 is at Cr), the oscillation would persist indefinitely and A(t) approaches Cr
asymptotically.
The second factor of random fluctuations in agents’ exploratory behavior is caused
by the finite system size, which affects the oscillation stability. As the populations
[n(+,−) and n(−,+)] of the speculative agents decrease during the converging process,
the amplitude of oscillation, |n(+,−) − n(−,+)|, becomes comparable to √N , the
level of random fluctuations in the system. The occurrence of two consecutive steps
of A(t) > Cr (or A(t) < Cr) as a result of the fluctuations will break the regular
oscillation pattern. In the thermodynamical limit, the effects of the random fluctuations
are negligible.
3.3. Time intervals between failure bursts
The dynamical evolution of the system can be described as random failure bursts
superimposed on regular oscillations with decreasing amplitude. The intermittent
failures can be characterized by the statistical distribution of the time interval T0
between two successive bursting events. Figure 3(a) shows a representative histogram
of T0 obtained from a single statistical realization of the system dynamics (the inset’s
showing the same data but on a semi-logarithmic scale). A remarkable feature is that
the distributions of the odd (red crosses) and even values of T0 (blue squares) are
characteristically distinct. In particular, the odd values of T0 emerge with a smaller
probability and the corresponding distribution has a smaller most probable value as
compared with that for the even values of T0. A possible explanation lies in the existence
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of two intrinsically distinct processes.
Figure 3. Statistical distributions of the time interval T0 between two
successive bursts of failure. (a) The distributions obtained from one realization
of the system dynamics, where those of the odd T0 values (red crosses) and even T0
values (blue squares) are remarkably distinct. (b) T0 versus the deviation A0 − Cr
of the equilibrium position from the resource capacity. The solid squares (triangles)
denote the most probable value of the set of even (odd) T0 values. The parameters are
α = 0.9, γ = 0.9, and N = 5001. (c-f) Schematic illustration of four cases associated
with the regular oscillations of A(t), where cases (c,d) lead to odd intervals T0 while
cases (e,f) lead to the even values of T0. The dashed curves represent the envelopes
that cross the capacity value Cr (solid blue lines), which triggers a failure burst.
Our computation and analysis indicate that the regular oscillation processes can
be classified into two categories, as shown in Figs. 3(c-f), leading to insights into the
mechanism for the two distinct types of statistical distributions in T0. In Fig. 3(c), A(t)
starts from a value below Cr = N/2 and terminates at a value above Cr, due to the
two consecutive values above Cr as the lower envelope of A(t) crosses Cr. Similarly, in
Fig. 3(d), A(t) starts from a value above Cr and terminates at a value below Cr, with
the upper envelope of A(t) crossing Cr. In Fig. 3(e), A(t) starts from a value below Cr
and terminates at a value below Cr. In Fig. 3(f), A(t) starts from a value above Cr
and terminates at a value above Cr. In Figs. 3(c) and 3(d), odd intervals are generated,
while in Figs. 3(e) and 3(f), the intervals are even. Between the cases in the same
category [e.g., (c,d) or (e,f)], there is little difference in the statistical distribution of T0,
especially in the long time limit.
We have seen that the equilibrium position A0 plays an important role in
terminating the regular oscillations, which can be calculated as A0 = 〈A(t)〉t, where 〈·〉t
denotes the average over time. From Fig. 3(b) where the time interval T0 is displayed
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as a function of the quantity A0−Cr, we see that the values of A0 closer to the capacity
Cr lead to regular oscillations with larger values of T0. The most probable values of
the distributions of the even (squares) and odd (stars) T0 values are also indicated in
Fig. 3(b).
3.4. Mean field theory
Figure 4. Comparison of dynamical evolution of the system obtained
from simulation and mean-field theory. The attendance A(t) obtained from
(a) multiagent simulation, and (b) numerical solution of Eqs. (4-9). (c,d) The
corresponding results of the elements of Q from multi-agent simulation and from
numerical solution, respectively. The insets in (a-d) show the corresponding time
series of A(t) and Q in a large time regime. The parameters are α = 0.9, γ = 0.9,
 = 0.02, and N = 5001.
We develop a mean-field analysis to capture the main features of the dynamical
evolution of the multi-agent AI minority system. We assume that the agents empowered
with reinforced learning are identical and share the same matrix Q. The dynamical
evolution of A(t) can be described by the following equation:
dA(t)
dt
= 
N
2
+ (1− )[A(t)Θ(X1) + (N − A(t))Θ(X2)]− A(t), (5)
where the first item N/2 is the number of agents that act randomly with probability ,
half of which select +1. The second item indicates the number of agents that act based
on the matrix Q with probability 1− , which include agents that stay in the +1 state
and those that transition from −1 to +1. Θ(X) denotes the step function: Θ(X) = 0
for X < 0, Θ(X) = 1/2 for X = 0, and Θ(X) = 1 for X > 0. The quantities X1 and
X1 are defined as X1 ≡ Qt(s+, a+)−Qt(s+, a−), and X2 ≡ Qt(s−, a+)−Qt(s−, a−).
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The elements of the matrix Q are updated according to the following rules:
dQt(s+, a+)
dt
= α[RΘ(X3) + γQ
max
t −Qt(s+, a+)][(1− )Θ(X1) +
1
2
], (6)
dQt(s+, a−)
dt
= α[RΘ(−X3) + γQmaxt −Qt(s+, a−)][(1− )Θ(−X1) +
1
2
],(7)
dQt(s−, a+)
dt
= α[RΘ(X3) + γQ
max
t −Qt(s−, a+)][(1− )Θ(X2) +
1
2
], (8)
dQt(s−, a−)
dt
= α[RΘ(−X3) + γQmaxt −Qt(s−, a−)][(1− )Θ(−X2) +
1
2
],(9)
where, X3 ≡ N − 2A(t), the step function Θ(X3) indicates whether or not the
agents gain a reward, Qmaxt is the expected value after action. Specifically, we have
Qmaxt = max[Qt(s+, a+), Qt(s+, a−)] in Eqs. (6) and (8) for the agents who take action
to transition to +1. Similarly, Qmaxt = max[Qt(s−, a+), Qt(s−, a−)] in Eqs. (7) and (9)
is for agents taking action to transition to the state −1.
The dynamical evolution of the system can thus be assessed either through
simulation, as presented in Figs. 4(a) and 4(c), or through the mean-field equations
Eqs. (4-9), as shown in Figs. 4(b) and 4(d). A comparison between These results
indicates that the mean-field equations Eqs. (4-9) capture the main features of the
collective dynamics of the AI minority system, which are regular oscillations with
converging amplitude and intermittent bursts of failure.
4. Discussion
Complex resource allocation systems with a large number of interacting components are
ubiquitous in the modern society. Optimal performance of such a system is typically
measured by uniform and even utilization of all available resources by the users. Often
this is not possible due to the phenomenon of herding that can emerge spontaneously in
the evolution of the system, in which most agents utilize only a few resources, leaving
the vast majority of the remaining resources little exploited [11, 16, 17, 32, 34, 35, 46–
51]. The heading behavior can propagate through the system, as the few heavily used
resources would be depleted quickly, directing most agents to another possibly small
set of resources, which would be depleted as well, and so on. A final outcome is the
total collapse of the entire system. An important goal in managing a complex resource
allocation system is to devise effective strategies to prevent the herding behavior from
occurring. We note that similar behaviors occur in economics [52–55]. Thus any effective
methods to achieve optimal performance of resource allocation systems can potentially
be generalized to a broader context.
Mathematically, a paradigm to describe and study the dynamics of complex resource
allocation is minority games, in which a large number agents are driven to seek the less
used resources based on available information to maximize payoff. In the minority
game framework, a recent work addressed the problem of controlling heading [33] using
the pinning method that had been studied in controlling collective dynamics such as
synchronization in complex networks [32, 56–62], where the dynamics of a small number
Artificial intelligence meets minority game: toward optimal resource allocation 14
of nodes are “pinned” to some desired behavior. In developing a pinning control scheme,
the fraction of agents chosen to hold a fixed state and the structure of the pinned agents
are key issues. For the minority game system, during the time evolution, fluctuations
that contain characteristically distinct components can arise: intrinsic and systematic,
and this allows one to design a control method based on separated control variables [33].
A finding was that biased pinning control pattern can lead to an optimal pinning
fraction that minimizes the system fluctuations, and this holds regardless of the network
topologies.
Any control based method aiming to suppress or eliminate herding requires external
input. The question we address in this paper is whether it would be possible to design
a “smart” type of resource allocation systems that can sense the potential emergence of
herding and adjust the game strategy accordingly to achieve the same goal but without
any external intervention. Our answer is affirmative. In particular, we introduce AI into
the minority game system in which the agents are “intelligent” and empowered with
reinforced learning. Exploiting a popular learning algorithm in AI, Q-learning, we find
that the collective dynamics can evolve to the optimal state in a self-organized fashion,
which is effectively immune from any herding behavior. Due to the complex dynamics,
the evolution toward the optimal state is not uninterrupted: there can be intermittent
bursts of failures. However, because of the power of self-learning, once a failure event
has occurred, the system can self-repair or self-adjust to start a new process of evolution
toward the optimal state, free of herding. A finding is that two distinct types of the
probability distribution of the intervals of free evolution (the time interval between two
successive failure events) arise, depending on the parity of the system state. We provide
a physical analysis and derive mean-field equations to understand these behaviors. AI
has become increasingly important and has been universally applied to all aspects of
the modern society. Our work demonstrates, for the first time, that the marriage of AI
with complex systems can generate optimal performance without the need of external
control or intervention.
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Appendix
Convergence mechanism of A(t)
Typically, after a failure burst, A(t) will converge to the value corresponding to the
optimal system state. The mechanism of convergence can be understood, as follows.
The essential dynamical event responsible for the convergence is the change of agents
from being speculative to being self-satisfied within the training time. If the inequalities
Q(s+, a+) < Q(s+, a−) and Q(s−, a−) < Q(s−, a+) hold, the agent is speculative
and wins the game all the time as a result of the state transition. Otherwise, for
Q(s+, a+) > Q(s+, a−) and Q(s−, a−) > Q(s−, a+), the agent is self-satisfied and wins
and loses the game alternatively.
Consider a speculative agent. Assume that its state is r = +1 at the current time
step. The agent selects r = +1 with the probability /2 and updates Q(s+, a+) with
reward or selects r = −1 with the probability /2 + (1 − ) and updates Q(s+, a−)
without reward. If the agent selects r = +1, the game will be lost, but the value of
Q(s+, a+) can increase. At the next time step, the agent selects r = −1 and loses the
game, and Q(s+, a−) will decrease. As a result, the inequality Q(s+, a+) > Q(s+, a−)
holds with the probability /2. That is, the probability that a speculative agent changes
to a self-satisfied one is approximately /2.
Now consider a self-satisfied agent in the r = +1 state at the current time step.
The agent selects r = +1 with the probability /2 + (1− ) and updates Q(s+, a+) with
two stable solutions (Q∗1 and Q
∗
2), or the agent selects r = −1 with the probability /2.
The agent selects r = −1 from the two stable solutions Q∗1 or Q∗2 with the respective
probability 1/2. If the agent is associated with the smaller stable solution Q∗2, then
Q(s+, a−) will decrease. As a result, the agent remains to be self-satisfied. If the agent
is associated with the larger stable solution Q∗1, then Q(s+, a−) will increase due to
reward, and the inequality Q(s+, a−) > Q(s+, a+) holds with the probability 1/2. At
the same time, if Q(s−, a+) > Q(s−, a−), the probability is approximately equal to 1/2,
and the self-satisfied agent successfully becomes a speculative agent. Otherwise, the self-
satisfied agent remains to be self-satisfied. That is, the probability that a self-satisfied
agent changes to being speculative is approximately /16 /2. As a result, A(t) will
converge to Cr asymptotically.
Two types of agents in the phase space For the AI minority game system, we can
construct the phase space, in which the two types of agents can be distinguished. We
define the Euclidean distance for the Q matrix of each agent as the square root of the sum
of all the matrix elements. For the two positions indicated by the red arrows in Fig. 1(a),
Figs. 5(a-d) show the relationship of Euclidean distance at three adjacent time steps. We
see that the agents can be distinguished and classified into two categories through the
Euclidean distance, where the self-satisfied and the speculative agents correspond to the
top and bottom sides of the line x = y and on the line x = y, respectively. The reason
that the speculative agents change their state while the self-satisfied agents remain in
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Figure 5. Euclidean distance for all agents empowered with reinforced
learning. The distances are indicated by the two red arrow positions in Fig. 1(a).
(a-d) Evolution of the Euclidean distance at three adjacent time steps: t+ 1 vs t and
t + 2 vs t + 1. The blue line is x = y. Panels (a,b) correspond to the left arrow,
and (c,d) to the right arrow. (e,f) The corresponding distributions of the Euclidean
distance.
their state lies in the property of the elements of the Q matrix. In particular, after the
system reaches a steady state after training, for the speculative agents, the following
inequalities hold: Q(s+, a+) < Q(s+, a−) and Q(s−, a−) < Q(s−, a+), while for the self-
satisfied agents, the inequalities are Q(s+, a+) > Q(s+, a−) and Q(s−, a−) > Q(s−, a+).
Since the values of the matrix elements Q(s+, a+) and Q(s−, a−) associated with the
self-satisfied agents are between Q∗1 and Q
∗
2, the Euclidean distance of these agents rolls
over on the line x = y at the adjacent time. However, the elements Q(s+, a−) and
Q(s−, a+) associated with the speculative agents reach only the stable solution Q∗3. As
a result, the Euclidean distance of these agents remain unchanged. Figures 5(e) and
5(f) show that the Euclidean distances for the agents display a two-peak distribution,
corresponding to the two types. The peak height on the left hand side increases with
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time, while that on the right hand side decreases.
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